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Reason is, and ought only to be, 
the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them . . . 
‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer 
the destruction of the whole world 
to the scratching of my finger. 
‘Tis not contrary to reason for me 
to chuse my total ruin, to prevent 
the least uneasiness of an Indian 
or a person wholly unknown to me 
(Hume 1888, 415-416).
I desire and I find myself with a 
powerful impulse to act.  But I back 
up and bring that impulse into view 
and then I have a certain distance. 
Now the impulse doesn’t dominate 
me and now I have a problem.  Shall 
I act?  Is this desire really a reason 
to act? (Korsgaard 1994, 93). 
I don’t think odd whims—the 
passing urge to stick my finger 
into a gooey substance, or the 
vertiginous urge to fling myself 
from a balcony—are considerations 
in favor of doing those things at all 
(Cohon 2000, 63).
1. The Perplexity
There is a puzzle, as yet unsolved, within 
Harry Frankfurt’s subtle and otherwise 
significantly developed theory of rational 
agency.  In this essay, I propose a solution that 
is simple and friendly to Frankfurt’s general 
theory.  My solution also has an important 
implication for our general theorizing 
about normative practical reasons: the 
best subjectivist model of rational agency 
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We often treat our basic, unmotivated desires as reason-giving: 
you’re thirsty and take yourself to have a reason to walk to 
the drinking fountain; you care intrinsically about your young 
daughter and take yourself to have a reason to feed and clothe 
her.  We (behave as though we) think these desires generate 
normative practical reasons.  But are there (satisfiable) basic 
desires that don’t?  It might seem so, for we sometimes find 
ourselves impelled to do some very strange, and some very 
awful, things.  For example, would a loving mother with a 
violent impulse thereby come to have a reason to harm her 
beloved child?  Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that there 
are (satisfiable) basic desires, such as the mother’s, that fail to 
generate reasons.  Can a subjectivist, a theorist in the Humean 
tradition, accept this thesis?  Against the historical grain, I argue 
yes.  I frame my discussion in terms of solving a puzzle in Harry 
Frankfurt’s subjectivist theory of rational agency and appeal to 
the concept of a personal ideal to reveal how a subjectivist, a 
follower of Hume, can countenance the existence of “rationally 
impotent basic desires.” 
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includes the concept of a “personal ideal.”  There is useful theoretical work for this concept 
to do, beyond helping Frankfurt.
Frankfurt’s puzzle has to do with long-standing disputes among the Humean subjectivist, 
Kantian constructivist, and (Aristotelian) realist traditions about the ultimate source of 
normative practical reasons and the rational appraisal of “basic” or “ultimate” desires 
(Cullity and Gaut 1997).  A reader who first confronts the puzzle in Frankfurt’s writing 
might express it in the following accurate though sketchy way: Frankfurt is a subjectivist 
about practical reasons, in the Humean tradition, who says some very un-Humean-sounding 
things, a boisterously polemical anti-Kantian and anti-realist who says some very Kantian- 
and realist-sounding things.  One such thing: Frankurt believes there are instances in which 
an agent ought, having determined that one of her own basic, unmotivated desires1 doesn’t 
“deserve a voice” in practical deliberation, to “categorically reject” the claim it has made 
on her.  
Take an oft-cited example.  A loving mother is shocked and disconcerted to find in herself, 
while bathing her much beloved infant, an altogether unprecedented impulse to drown 
him (Watson 1982, 100-101).  Frankfurt declares it would be “preposterous”—presumably, 
either for the mother or for a philosopher—to think this violent desire gives the mother 
a reason, even a very weak reason, to kill her child (2006, 31).  This motivational state, 
Frankfurt says, should not merely be “assigned a relatively less favored position” in the 
mother’s decision about what to do; it should be disenfranchised, “extruded entirely as an 
outlaw” (1988, 170; 2006, 8).
Frankfurt’s reader might sensibly ask, “Isn’t the castigation of categorical norms of practical 
reasoning a common pastime in the Humean tradition?2  And yet Frankfurt eschews this 
practice.  Don’t subjectivists characteristically say that we can properly reason about means, 
but not ends?3  Or that basic desires are, as Hume himself puts it, ‘original existences’ that 
cannot be ‘contrary to reason’ (1748, 293)?  And yet Frankfurt describes this very claim, 
so often taken to be a theory-defining tenet of Humean subjectivism, as ‘preposterous.’ 
Frankfurt thinks the mother would be absolutely correct to judge her basic desire ‘contrary 
to reason,’ at least in the following sense: though there are effective means to the violent 
urge’s satisfaction, the mother has, Frankfurt thinks, absolutely ‘no reason whatsoever’ to 
take any of them.  Can a consistent, clear-headed subjectivist, an intellectual heir of David 
Hume, believe this?”
I think so, and I intend to reveal how.  In the neo-Humean4 subjectivist view I sketch, 
1    A motivated desire is a desire generated by another desire through a process of instrumental reasoning (Hubin 1991).  If you 
desire health, come to believe drinking water is healthy, and consequently come to desire to drink water as a means, your desire 
to drink water is a motivated desire.  A basic, unmotivated desire is a desire that isn’t generated from another desire in this way. 
It is, in this sense, an “original existence.” 
2    A clear example: Dreier (2001).
3    Russell (1954, 8). 
4    Though contemporary subjectivism draws inspiration from Hume, it departs from him in at least two ways.  First, subjectivists 
generally abandon Hume’s theory that motivational states are feelings; contemporary subjectivists generally accept the (more 
plausible) thesis that a person can have a desire without feeling it.  A second deviation concerns Hume’s reduction of reason to 
theoretical rationality.  Say an agent is motivated, in a basic way, to achieve an end, believes rationally that a particular action is 
the best means to it, doesn’t think there is any overriding countervailing practical reason, but fails to perform this action.  This 
agent is guilty of a form of non-theoretical irrationality, “means-end irrationality.”  A theory of practical rationality should make 
conceptual room for this possibility (Korsgaard 1986).  Hume’s theory doesn’t, whereas contemporary subjectivists not only 
accept that means-end irrationality is a form of practical irrationality, it generally serves as a paradigm example in their theorizing 
(Millgram 1995; Smith 1987, 1994).
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practical rationality is, broadly speaking, a matter of pursuing what you care about, with 
proficiency.5  And people—some people, at least—care about some very complex things, 
among them, personal ideals that include norms that specify which desires not to treat as 
reason-giving. 
In this essay, I clarify the central tenets of subjectivism; describe the relevant puzzle, 
indicating why it initially seems so difficult for a subjectivist to solve it; sketch my 
proposal; and—because my theoretically modest solution is relatively simple—suggest 
why this proposal hasn’t yet been recognized.6  To solve his puzzle, Frankfurt needs to 
make both a change in argumentative tactic and a distinction between two varieties of 
desire “extrusion.”    
2. What Is Subjectivism about Practical Reasons?
Let’s understand a normative practical reason, hereafter ‘practical reason,’ to be a 
consideration in favor of doing something.7  It’s a proper input into practical deliberation, a 
normative entity that ought to be counted in the process of deciding what to do.  I’ll regard 
a practical reason as a pro tanto consideration: it does supply a positive consideration in 
favor of doing something, a consideration that ought to be weighed against whatever other 
practical reasons an agent happens to have, though it could conceivably be outweighed by 
one or more of them.  For example, you might have a practical reason to take the afternoon 
off, but a weightier practical reason to put your nose to the grindstone.  
Subjectivism is, among other things, a theory about the ultimate source of practical 
reasons.  It claims that an agent’s practical reasons, all of them, ultimately derive from 
among the “elements” of “his subjective motivational set, S” (Williams 1994)—or, put 
more commonsensically, from among his own desires.  This claim has been called, usefully, 
“the desire-based reasons thesis” (Kagan 1992; Hubin 1999).8  To give a stock subjectivist 
example, your thirst—your basic, unmotivated desire for something to drink—gives you 
a practical reason to take the means to satisfy it, walking to the drinking fountain or to the 
soda machine, say.  We might put the subjectivist’s defining idea in this way.  (I often will.) 
In the stock example, your thirst is “rationally potent”: it generates practical reasons.  The 
desire, along with facts relevant to its satisfaction, is the source of practical reasons for you. 
Cut at its joints, subjectivism is committed, alongside the desire-based reasons thesis, to a 
second tenet, an instrumental principle that communicates normativity from a (rationally 
potent) basic desire to the (effective) means to its satisfaction.  Together, these two elements 
make up the “core elements” of the subjectivist theory.
Another characteristic of subjectivism—more difficult to define, but crucial to understanding 
this theory—is its theoretical modesty.  Given its commitment to the desire-based reasons 
thesis, subjectivism regards practical reasons as agent-relative: the considerations relevant 
to answering the question “What, rationally speaking, should this particular agent do?” 
ultimately derive from among her own subjective, contingent, conative states—from 
5    Similarly: “Some things are dear to our hearts.  To act rationally . . . means in essence: to look after these things, as best we 
can” (Fehige 2001, 49.) 
6    Frankfurt does gesture at the concept of a personal ideal (in the preface to Necessity, Volition, and Love 1999).  
7    I don’t deny there are also considerations in favor of desiring, feeling, or being a certain way.  But I will speak of practical 
reasons as considerations in favor of acting.
8    Whether Williams himself is an advocate of the desire-based reasons thesis has been questioned.  Dancy argues we should be 
careful to distinguish between the desire-based reasons thesis and Williams’ internalism about practical reasons (2000, 18-19).  
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among her own whims, impulses, desires, wants, cares, intentions, pro-attitudes, and 
the like—and from nowhere else.  Accordingly, subjectivism rejects any appeal to extra-
subjectivist practical reasons or extra-subjectivist constraints upon practical reasons.  That 
is, a subjectivist cannot regard any purported normative standard, whether a realist standard 
of objective worth, a robust Kantian rule of practical reason such as the Categorical 
Imperative, or some other standard, as rationally binding upon an agent regardless of what 
she happens to want.9  Subjectivists believe, as Hume puts it, that practical reason’s proper 
task—the only “office” to which it should “pretend”—is to “serve” ends the agent herself 
already desires.  
Subjectivists often describe their view in the following way.  When we ask an agent for a 
rational justification of his behavior, a chain of practical justifications properly “bottoms 
out” in an appeal to a basic desire, such as “because I was thirsty” or “because I care 
intrinsically about my child’s welfare.”  In the subjectivist’s view, practical rationality 
doesn’t require that the agent have some further justification for why he should treat these 
basic desires as reason-giving.  Motivational states such as these are the ultimate grounds 
of legitimate practical reasoning.
Subjectivism is sometimes considered the default position in theorizing about practical 
reasons (Nozick 1993, 133; Hubin 1996; Millgram 2001).  It’s often touted as having a 
significant theoretical virtue.  The agent-relative practical reasons it posits seem to have 
the compelling force we expect from practical reasons.  Since according to subjectivism 
your practical reasons derive from among your own basic desires, you cannot “shrug off” 
these considerations; you can’t properly say you don’t care about, aren’t moved by, the 
perspective from which they are generated (Hubin 1996).
Critics sometimes object that subjectivism is overly simple, even crude.  Admittedly, 
there is a reductionist strain within the subjectivist tradition.  For example, some (famous) 
adherents of subjectivism seem to accept the view that all legitimate practical reasoning is 
instrumental in a very straightforward sense: “‘Reason’ has a perfectly clear and precise 
meaning.  It signifies the choice of right means to an end you wish to achieve.  It has 
nothing whatever to do with the choice of ends” (Russell 1954).  But subjectivism isn’t 
by its very nature simplistic.  More precisely, it isn’t committed to a simplistic model or 
conception of instrumental reasoning.  
Here is what I have in mind.  Subjectivism certainly treats the process of instrumental 
reasoning—identifying basic desires; seeking effective means—as the paradigm activity 
of practical reasoning.  And when subjectivists provide illustrations, they generally appeal 
to what we might call “straightforward” or “garden-variety” examples of instrumental 
reasoning that seek out (i) causal, (ii) criteriological, or (iii) mereological means to already-
desired ends: (i) being thirsty and seeking out behavior that will cause the thirst to go 
away, or (ii) wanting to run an officially-sponsored marathon and seeking out a race that 
meets the relevant criteria, or (iii) hoping to complete a particular twelve-step program and 
seeking out what the third step in the program actually requires (Hubin 1999). 
There are, though, species of subjectivism that posit forms of practical reasoning that are 
9    Except for the instrumental principle itself.  If by ‘categorical imperative’ we mean a rule rationally binding upon an agent 
independent of the content of his contingent, subjective basic desires, the instrumental principle is such a principle (Dreier 2001). 
In my subjectivist view, even the principle of prudence gains whatever rational validity it happens to have for a person only and 
ultimately from her own basic desires, whether directly from her intrinsic concern for her own (long-term) welfare, indirectly from 
an instrumental need to take care of herself if she hopes to successfully pursue the satisfaction of her other (long-term) desired 
ends, or both (Hubin 1979).  
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desire-based but do not fit the profile suggested by the examples of causal, criterial, or 
mereological reasoning.  For instance, Schmidtz argues that some legitimate practical 
reasoning is “mauetic”: a matter not of finding right means to already-desired ends, but 
of seeking out and choosing new ends to desire (2001).  Say you find yourself wanting 
but lacking a sense of meaning in your life, and you come to the belief—let’s assume 
justified and true—that this sense would come if only you were to have goals you care 
about intrinsically.  You would thereby come to have a practical reason to seek out new 
goals—newly-desired ends—you can care about in this way.  Since your choice of new 
basic desires is in the service of satisfying another basic desire (for a meaningful life), 
mauetic reasoning is agent-relative and desire-based, and Schmidtz’s proposal coheres, 
deeply, with subjectivism.  The ultimate source of the practical advice ‘choose a new end 
to desire’ is the voice of one of your basic desires (for a meaningful life), enlightened by 
(accurate, we’re assuming) reflections upon what it takes to satisfy it.  Schmidtz’s model 
of practical reasoning is, this is to say, more complex in structure than Russell’s.  And pace 
Russell, not only can we reason about ends, subjectivists can countenance the belief that 
we can.   
Likewise, my proposal suggests a structural complexity that is, against the historical grain, 
available to subjectivism: a form of “categorical” reasoning, the disenfranchising of basic 
desires that violate a cared-about personal ideal.  A basic desire that violates an agent’s 
personal ideal doesn’t generate a practical reason that is “trumped,” or even “swamped,” by 
other practical reasons; the desire is, to tweak the Aristotelian John McDowell’s preferred 
terminology, “silenced” (1979).10  Since in my view it is the agent’s caring about the ideal 
that makes the ideal and whatever norms it includes normative for her, my proposal also 
posits a desire-based but non-garden-variety form of practical reasoning and so coheres, 
deeply, with the core elements of subjectivism.  
Let’s turn to the puzzle as it presents itself in Frankfurt’s thinking.  The perplexity arises 
very acutely there, and in a way that sometimes makes Frankfurt’s otherwise stable and 
consistent theoretical commitments waver.
3. Frankfurt’s Commitments
Frankfurt’s Subjectivist Commitments  
The textual evidence strongly suggests that Frankfurt is a subjectivist.  Frankfurt thinks 
there are rationally potent basic desires, such as your thirst.  He accepts the theory-defining 
thesis about the ultimate source of practical reasons: all of them derive, ultimately, from 
among your own subjective, contingent basic desires.  Frankfurt thinks there is, in the very 
least, a standard—or “default”—connection between having a basic desire and having 
a practical reason to take the means to satisfying it (2006, 8).  Frankfurt’s metaphors 
are stock subjectivist; an agent’s practical reasoning is properly governed, he says, by 
her “heart” not by the “head,” and when it comes to deciding what to do “reason” is “in 
service of what we love” (2006, 3).  He expresses a strong commitment to an agent-relative 
conception of practical reasons (2006, 33).  And he explicitly rejects the central tenets of 
both Kantianism and realism.  Frankfurt’s boisterousness comes through when he calls the 
Kantian and realist programs, each of them, a “will o’ the wisp,” motivated by the “pan-
rationalist fantasy” that we are able to provide “an exhaustively rational warrant” for a 
conception of how people, all people, ought to conduct their lives (2004, 28).  Similar to 
Hume, Frankfurt believes that if it happens to be rationally advisable for you to live a moral 
10    For McDowell, a “silenced” consideration doesn’t even arise in the virtuous agent’s practical deliberation.  In Frankfurt’s 
terminology, to say a desire is “silenced” is to say it is treated as unworthy of consideration.  
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life, this is true—not because practical reason, by its very nature, demands it, but—because 
living morally is called for by the ends you happen to care most about.  
Frankfurt is, as I read him, a restless subjectivist, perturbed by the reductionist tendency in 
the Humean tradition, with a broad agenda to refine, and so to strengthen, the subjectivist 
theory.  For example, subjectivism is sometimes associated with a “minimalist” theory of 
human psychology and a simple, straightforward belief-desire model of action.  Frankfurt 
isn’t a minimalist, as he makes vividly clear in his characteristic rollicking style:
When philosophers or economists or others attempt to analyze the various 
structures and strategies of practical reasoning, they generally draw upon a more 
or less standard but nonetheless rather meager conceptual repertoire.  Perhaps 
the most elementary as well as the most indispensable of these limited resources 
is the notion of what people want—or, synonymously (at least according to the 
somewhat procrustean convention that I shall adopt here), what they desire.  
This notion is rampantly ubiquitous.  It is also heavily overburdened, and a 
bit limp.  People routinely deploy it in a number of different roles, to refer to 
a disparate and unruly assortment of psychic conditions and events (2004, 10, 
emphasis his).  
Frankfurt wants to do better. 11  He wants a less meager conceptual repertoire, a more subtle 
taxonomy of motivation.  Much of his work over the past four decades has been an attempt 
to provide one.  
Frankfurt’s most significant contributions to subjectivist theorizing are his discussions of 
caring about and loving.12  According to Frankfurt, an agent’s will, her “practical point 
of view,” consists of complex motivational states with the normative authority to govern 
her practical deliberation and subsequent behavior.  Though at times a mere desire—an 
afternoon’s urge to eat an ice cream cone, say—generates a final ‘ought’ of practical reason, 
an agent’s weightiest practical reasons often derive from among her “ruling passions.” 
For example, an unwilling drug addict, even if she is presently in the grips of an intense 
and causally very powerful urge to take heroin, ought not take the drugs.  In the very 
least, she has a (far) weightier practical reason to frustrate her present urge in virtue of the 
fact that there are things she cares about that discourage or even forbid her from taking 
drugs.  Frankfurt doesn’t generally specify what these things are, but presumably she 
cares about being in control of her own life, and so not in the grips of an addiction; being 
healthy, physically and financially; spending her time on her career or with her family, 
and not in sketchy locales.  All of these considerations speak forcefully against satisfying 
her addiction.  In Frankfurt’s general view, the normative weight of a practical reason 
is determined not, at the bottom level, by the felt intensity or causal power of the basic 
desire that generates it, but by its source.  A practical reason produced by one of her ruling 
passions will generally carry significant weight.  “Love,” Frankfurt tells us, “is a powerful 
source of reasons” (2006, 42). 
11    Millgram also structures his discussion of contemporary theorizing about practical reasoning by beginning with an exceedingly 
simple, subjectivist theory.  He then categorizes various theorists as either complicating or rejecting one or another feature of this 
very simple theory.  This is a useful framework (2001).  
12    For Frankfurt, ‘caring about’ and ‘love’ are technical terms.  To care about a person is to desire her welfare, to be “satisfied” 
with so desiring, and to see yourself as being given strong practical reasons to advance her welfare.  To love someone is to care 
about her, inescapably: to be unwilling to oppose the requirements caring about her places on you, when this unwillingness is 
itself something which you are unwilling to alter.  Frankfurt discusses this concept in a number of articles.  See, for instance, 
‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love’ (1999; also 2004).   
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For his four-decade subjectivist project, Herman describes Frankfurt—aptly, I think—as 
one of the “premier modern practitioners” of “theoretically abstemious bootstrapping” 
(253).  In bootstrapping,
you use a little of what you already have to get some place you haven’t been 
before, but need to go.  As a strategy of argument, it is environmentally neutral.  
No new resources—new entities or capacities—are called for; little of what you 
start with is wasted . . . The bootstrap is made of the same basic materials, only 
attached in a different place, so as to provide additional elements of argument.  
The idea is to provide just enough leverage in the argument to give a better 
account of the complexity (2002, 253).
Frankfurt has attempted to bootstrap his way to an account of the human will.  He wants 
to account for common intuitions, such as the intuition that the unwilling addict has a 
weightier practical reason not to satisfy her intensely felt, causally powerful addictive 
impulse, by appealing to a theoretically modest conception of the will that construes the 
will as a set of complex motivational states, which practical reason ought, especially, 
to serve.  In Frankfurt’s view, though basic desires are, when the standard or default 
conditions hold, rationally potent, the vantage point from which the agent’s weightiest 
practical reasons generally derive is defined in terms of the agent’s cares and loves.  These 
are the considerations that the agent can’t, on pains of practical irrationality, “shrug off.” 
Clearly, Frankfurt doesn’t want a theory so modest it can’t account for the intuition that 
human beings are agents who sometimes play an active role in determining their own 
behavior.  As reflective creatures, we aren’t, Frankfurt believes, invariably and merely 
“pushed around by conflicting psychological forces” (Cohon 2000, 64); we sometimes 
act, properly speaking.  Frankfurt’s long-standing view is that when a person behaves on 
the basis of a desire with which she “identifies,” her behavior is, in a deep sense, her own. 
Frankfurt goes to great pains to develop an abstemious account of “identification with a 
desire” that construes “identification” in terms of higher order desires with which the agent 
is “satisfied,” where being satisfied with a desire D consists in the absence of any persistent 
desire or intention to stop desiring D.  Frankfurt emphasizes that being satisfied, in his 
view, doesn’t essentially involve any judgments of objective worth.  In this way, Frankfurt 
wants to make do without appealing to any “new resources—new entities or capacities,” by 
“attaching” the “same basic materials”—desires, intentions, and the like—“in a different 
place.”  
Frankfurt’s abstemiousness is also on display when he explicitly criticizes anti-subjectivist 
proposals that attempt to account for the idea that some (satisfiable) basic desires don’t 
generate any practical reasons.  Cohon thinks that a desire to stick your finger in goo would 
not, even could not, generate any practical reason for anyone because this messy behavior 
has (she believes) absolutely no objective value (2000, 63).  Wolf argues for (what she takes 
to be) a more “modest” form of normative realism, according to which basic desire doesn’t 
generate a practical reason if the object of the desire has objective disvalue.  In her view, 
bizarre but trivial and morally unobjectionable desires—such as the desire to stick your 
finger in goo, perhaps—generate practical reasons, but vengeful impulses and petty envy 
are rationally impotent.  Some moral standards, she thinks, operate as rationally-binding 
norms of rational impotence (2002, 227-244).  Frankfurt raises the standard subjectivist 
objection to these realist proposals: these proposals are guilty, as he puts, of “one thought 
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too many” (2006, 36-39).13  Chains of practical reasoning properly bottom out, Frankfurt 
here stresses, in an appeal to our desired ends, which are the ultimate “touchstone” of 
our practical reasoning.  In his positive theorizing, Frankfurt is adamant that a beloved 
child has value to his mother because she loves him.  It is her caring about him, Frankfurt 
declares, that “creates” his value to her.  And he insists, over and over, that nothing in the 
world is inherently valuable.  Things take on value for us because we care about them 
(2006, 36-39).  Bottom out, indeed.  
This litany of theoretical commitments represents, I submit, the mind of a theoretically 
abstemious subjectivist, however restless, at work.  
Frankfurt’s Seemingly Unsubjectivist Remarks
For all the depth and width of his subjectivist commitments, Frankfurt avows, repeatedly 
and emphatically, the existence of basic desires—motivational states, “elements of S”—that 
don’t generate any practical reasons whatsoever.  Though in accordance with subjectivism 
Frankfurt accepts that there’s a standard connection between having a basic desire and 
having a practical reason to satisfy it, he thinks that this regular link is, in some instances, 
severed.  In such cases, there is a basic desire, an adequate means to its satisfaction, and 
yet no practical reason—no pro tanto consideration—to take this or any means because 
the desire, in Frankfurt’s view, does not “deserve a voice.”  In this case, the agent should 
“silence” the basic desire, “extrude” it “entirely” from the context of decision making.14 
Frankfurt accepts, we might say, “the Occasional Rational Impotence Thesis” (ORIT), the 
claim that there are some “rationally impotent” basic desires.15  The unwilling addict’s 
present and very intense desire to take heroin is sometimes regarded as Frankfurt’s 
canonical example of a rationally impotent basic desire.16  More recently, Frankfurt has 
proposed another, very similar to Watson’s: he imagines finding in himself a murderous 
impulse against his own beloved son (2006, 10-13).
Clarifying Remarks 
There is significant discussion in the philosophical literature about how readers should 
interpret Frankfurt’s examples.  Let me be clear about how I will.  
First, I assume ‘to silence a desire’ doesn’t mean to deny its existence, or even to attempt 
to.  For one, to regard a desire as rationally impotent, you have to, at some level, think it 
exists.  Moreover, we can imagine cases in which a person both silences a desire and is 
under no illusion about either its existence or its content.  An unwilling drug addict, weary 
of her addiction, might be all too familiar with it.  Far from ignoring her addiction, she 
13    Williams provides the most famous arguments against anti-subjectivism, namely, arguments against subjectivism posit 
extra-subjectivist practical reasons, or extra-subjectivist constraints on practical reasons, that are “heavy-handed, dogmatic, 
and unconvincing” (2001).  When Frankfurt criticizes anti-subjectivist proposals, he seems to accept Williams’ broad critique. 
Frankfurt also, as you can see, employs Williams’ well-known ‘one-thought-too-many’ phrase.  That said, Frankfurt changes the 
meaning of this phrase; in Frankfurt’s argument, this phrase expresses the idea that an agent’s basic desire does not need to be 
endorsed by, say, a realist standard of objective worth to have normative validity for her.  Williams uses the phrase to exonerate 
a husband who, when presented with the opportunity to save his wife’s life, doesn’t happen to consider whether his behavior is 
justifiable, when he could have saved the lives of other people instead.    
14     Frankfurt (2006, 11-14) shares a political metaphor with Kant (1785, 21).
15    Frankfurt generalizes: rationally impotent basic desires are, statistically speaking, relatively uncommon; most of the vast 
number of desires that well up in the common run of life “attach to a moving principle within” the agent.  That said, he thinks 
rationally impotent basic desires exist (2006, 8).        
16    See ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ and ‘Identification and Externality’ (1988).  Frankfurt doesn’t, though, 
invariably employ the case of the unwilling drug addict as an example of a person treating a desire as rationally impotent.
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might believe herself to have a very strong reason to keep a wary eye on this “outlaw,” on 
the grounds close attention will help her defeat it.  Accordingly, in my discussion, ‘to silence 
a desire’ means—nothing more and nothing less than—to treat the desire as undeserving of 
a positive voice in the decision-making process.  This behavior doesn’t, by its very nature, 
involve self-delusion, as some commentators have worried.17  
Second, I assume Frankfurt stipulates that the psychological state he confronts—what he 
calls his “murderous impulse”—is a basic, unmotivated desire (that is, a desire that isn’t 
generated by another desire through a process of instrumental reasoning).18  Of course, 
philosophical examples are often initially under-described, and the example of the loving 
father certainly admits of other interpretations.  We could imagine that the father is mistaken 
about his mental state.  Perhaps his son has been frustratingly argumentative, and what 
the father wants, in a basic way, is peace and quiet, in which case his urge to shoot his 
son is nothing more than a derived desire, grounded in a recognition that shooting the boy 
is an expedient, though ghastly, means to (short-term!) peace and quiet.  Or perhaps the 
father’s psychological state is merely a passing thought, not a motivational state.  An image 
of shooting his son has presented itself to the father’s mind’s eye.  Horrified by the image, 
the father experiences a visceral feeling—a sense of agitation—not altogether distinct from 
the feelings that often accompany unsatisfied motivational states.  The father subsequently 
throws a label—the wrong label—at the experience: “I feel an impulse to kill my son.”
But if we interpret Frankfurt’s example in either of these two ways (or several others19), then 
the troublesome puzzle slips through our fingers.  On these interpretations, the case simply 
doesn’t pose a serious theoretical question for subjectivism generally or for Frankfurt’s 
abstemious but non-reductivist subjectivist theorizing.  A basic desire for peace and quiet is 
not, on anyone’s theory, rationally objectionable; the best rational advice to give the father 
would be to seek out a less costly means—such as ‘walk out of the room’—to his perfectly 
acceptable end.  And if the mental state is a daydream and not a desire, the subjectivist 
theory isn’t committed to giving it any reason-giving power; whatever objections should be 
levied at this nightmarish vision, these objections aren’t objections to the core elements of 
subjectivism.
  
It’s only if we imagine the father’s violent impulse to be a basic desire that the perplexity 
arises.  The unusual element in the thought experiment, what is supposed to stick out in our 
minds, is the distressing urge and its normative status.  Frankfurt is pressing his reader to 
accept ORIT on the strength of this case: 
The fact that shooting him is likely to kill him gives me no reason at all to shoot 
him, even though it is true that I have a desire to kill him and shooting him might 
do the trick (2006, emphasis his).  
Accordingly, Frankfurt says his distressing mental state is not merely desire-like, sharing 
some but not the defining features of a desire; the lethal impulse is, as he puts it, a “real” 
17    There’s a cottage industry of articles that argue Frankfurt misunderstands his own examples.  Velleman objects to Frankfurt’s 
theory that there are “external” desires on the grounds that it endorses a “common defensive strategy” that is mentally unhealthy.  To 
extrude an objectionable desire, Velleman thinks, is an act of wishful thinking, aimed at ignoring parts of ourselves we don’t happen 
to like (2002).  For similar views, see Thalberg (1989) and Arpaly and Schroeder (1999).
18    See footnote #1.  
19    There are more.  First, the father’s thought that his urge gives him no reason to kill his child could be construed as merely 
performative: he might be assuring his spouse, or himself, he won’t be acting on the impulse.  Or second, he might be weakening 
the impulse: denying it reason-giving authority might strip it of some of its causal potency.  Even if the claim “the impulse generates 
no reasons” were false, thinking it true might be a very effective tactic.
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desire. 
With these two points clarified, Frankfurt’s target becomes clearer.  He’s challenging a 
penchant within the Humean tradition to rely exclusively on the “trumping model.” 
According to this model, all (satisfiable) basic desires generate practical reasons and the real 
work of practical reasoning is the work—sometimes hard, sometimes easy—of weighing 
competing practical reasons to figure out which practical reason is the final ‘ought’ of 
rational advice.  Frankfurt, though, simply isn’t worried about what the father ultimately 
ought to do.  Obviously, all things considered, the father ought to take his finger off the 
trigger.  Even on standard subjectivist grounds, the case against the violent urge, taken as a 
candidate for satisfaction, is ridiculously over-determined.  On plausible assumptions about 
what the father cares about—again, Frankfurt doesn’t explicitly say—there are myriad and 
weighty considerations that speak against killing his son; to name a few: since he doesn’t 
want to go jail; since he doesn’t want to feel the shame and guilt that would overwhelm him 
if he were to commit murder; since he doesn’t want to meet face-to-face, after the event, 
with a wife who is enraged, baffled, and grieving desperately.  And from the father’s own 
perspective, the most important voice speaking against pulling the trigger is his love for his 
son.  He wants his children to flourish; killing his son won’t serve this strongly-desired end. 
In summary, Frankfurt’s pulling the trigger would rob his son, we are to presume, of a 
valuable and much-desired future and would rob Frankfurt of a much-desired future shared 
with him.  Frankfurt means for his example to point to a perfectly ordinary and caring 
parent, with an (otherwise) healthy relationship with his son.  What’s at stake is whether 
subjectivism is committed to assimilating this case, and all such cases, to the trumping 
model, the model which subjectivists generally employ.  Frankfurt, I conclude, wants 
subjectivism to appeal to the “silencing model,” even though, historically speaking, this is 
a thesis far more often trumpeted by Kantians and realists. 
4. Why is This Puzzle Especially Difficult for a Subjectivist to Solve?
At this point, we can state very forcefully the perplexity Frankfurt’s theorizing confronts, 
what it is and what it’s not.  
Frankfurt isn’t guilty of a logical contradiction.  The core elements of subjectivism, as I 
construe them, don’t logically commit subjectivists to the thesis that all (satisfiable) basic 
desires generate practical reasons.  The desire-based reasons thesis states that every practical 
reason ultimately derives from a basic desire.  This, by itself, entails that only basic desires 
generate practical reasons, but not that all basic desires generate them.  If subjectivists, 
as a group, are compelled to reject ORIT and be indiscriminately universalistic about the 
rational potency of (satisfiable) basic desires, it will have to be further considerations, 
beyond the core elements, that logically forces them into this view.
What Frankfurt’s theory suffers from is a lacuna.  For all his good work, Frankfurt hasn’t 
provided a satisfactory account of what makes rationally impotent basic desires rationally 
impotent.20  To Frankfurt’s credit, ORIT is plausible.  People find themselves impelled to 
do some very strange things, and some things more awful than strange.  Personally, I’m not 
convinced everyone would find a desire to stick a finger in goo rationally impotent; there 
is, about it, something wondrously antagonistic to bourgeois standards of cleanliness.  But 
many a parent would share Frankfurt’s intuition that his murderous impulse, as it clamors 
‘Kill the boy, Kill the boy,’ shouldn’t merely be “muffled” but “silenced,” “extruded,” 
20   It’s more accurate to say Frankfurt hasn’t settled, decisively, on an account.  He gestures at answers (1988, 168).
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“disenfranchised,” given no positive voice whatsoever in the process of deciding what 
to do.   Frankfurt is certainly gesturing at a phenomenon crying out for theoretical 
understanding.  But Frankfurt hasn’t indicated how the will, construed in his abstemious 
way, has the capacity to disenfranchise basic desires.  What exactly is supposed to do the 
normative work of disenfranchising, of ruling out the father’s violent impulse in some 
sense “categorically”?  None of the considerations against pulling the trigger mentioned 
so far, not even those I’ve added to the thought experiment, are able to do that.  They 
each operate as straightforward, garden-variety instrumental considerations.  It is because 
Frankfurt wants freedom from incarceration, from his wife’s wrath, and from the loss of his 
son that he ought to put down the gun.  Holding his finger steady is the best way, the most 
effective means, to save Frankfurt and his family a lot of loss and heartache.  
And it wouldn’t really help to appeal to Frankfurt’s idea that some of the father’s desires 
are “cares” or “loves.”  A mere appeal to the father’s desire for his son’s welfare gives him 
a garden-variety instrumental reason not to act upon the impulse, or even an instrumental 
reason to eradicate the desire, not a reason to regard it as rationally impotent and so “extrude” 
it “entirely.”  If caring about is a complex motivational state, a set of desires, then what 
we have is a case of desires (ruling passions) in competition with other desires (impulses), 
which, it seems, is to be handled by a trumping model.21  So, however much Frankfurt’s 
account of caring about and loving help subjectivism to overcome some challenges—the 
objections to minimalism, for instance—it isn’t sufficient by itself to resolve his long-
standing puzzle.  
What is needed for the disenfranchisement, the “categorical” rejection, of a basic desire, 
it seems, is something with a different “shape” than another desire—something such as a 
norm or a rule or a set of criteria, something with a deontic character, which a basic desire 
could conceivably violate, or perhaps a procedure or a test that a basic desire could be put 
through and conceivably fail.  These are the kinds of things realists and constructivists 
often offer, and Frankfurt explicitly rejects.  
Clearly, if Frankfurt is to stay consistent with his subjectivist commitments and to escape, 
in his theorizing, his own “one thought too many” objection, he can’t mean by ‘categorical’ 
all that Kant does.  The type of “categorical rational criticism” he advocates must be a 
form of desire-based, agent-relative criticism, which “bottoms out” in an appeal to a 
basic desire.  So what, if anything, can be said about this seemingly unprecedented and 
paradoxical-sounding type of rational criticism—Hume-style, desire-based, categorical 
rational criticism?  
To solve this puzzle, a change in argumentative strategy is called for.  What Frankfurt 
needs is not merely more conceptual analysis, but a good ear for practical anthropology: 
a sensitive appraisal of the substantive content of some of the personal ideals flesh-and-
blood human agents aspire to exemplify.  My own proposal doesn’t merely attach “old 
material”—such as a higher-order desire—in “a new place.”  It teases out the norms agents 
with personal ideals sometimes, in the run of life, confront.  
5. A Theoretically Modest Proposal
I’ve suggested there are instances in which an agent ought, as a matter of practical 
rationality, to disenfranchise a basic desire in virtue of a personal ideal he cares about.  The 
21    This is a new twist on an old objection by Watson (1982).  
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term ‘personal ideal’ is more suggestive than clear, and part of my task is to clarify what I 
do (not) mean by it.  One remark, to start: I regard a personal ideal as a normative standard 
that generates substantive practical advice.  Some personal ideals are very complex.  A 
personal ideal might answer a wide array of practical questions about how (not) to behave, 
how (not) to weigh practical reasons (against each other), how (not) to feel, and what 
character traits (not) to foster.
Consider, for instance, the case of a loving parent.  At the heart of a loving parent’s love 
is her desire for her child’s welfare, and this ruling passion makes demands upon her. 
Behavioral demands: she ought to feed and clothe her child.  And volitional demands: 
she ought to treat the fact that a course of action will significantly benefit her child as, in 
the very least, a significant practical reason to do it.  A ruling passion might also call for 
the adoption of personal guidelines.  For instance, a loving parent who consistently loses 
patience with her children, or who sometimes finds herself resentful of her children, might 
decide to adopt a maxim “Be more patient” or “Pay more attention to the good things that 
come from having children.”  As I see it, these guidelines are properly incorporated into her 
own practical point of view, into her will.  The voice of her love deserves a privileged seat 
at the table, with the practical authority—in some cases—to demand that the agent make 
significant changes in behavior, volition, and character and that the agent adopt maxims to 
help her pursue one of her ultimate goals, helping her children flourish.  As Frankfurt puts 
it, “Love makes demands.”  
As for Frankfurt’s own example of a loving father, there could be, alongside his concern 
for the welfare of his family, an additional desired end at stake.  If we take the father 
to be a normal (contemporary, western) parent, he likely has an abundance of concerns; 
among them, he might care about what kind of person to be.  Frankfurt’s example is thinly 
described, and I’ve already been thickening it, but in directions that don’t help.  Let me 
build more in, in a direction that will.  Let’s say that father wants to be a good, or at 
least a decent, parent; he has, it is natural to say, a personal ideal of parenting.  Having 
confronted his violent impulse, we could easily imagine him saying, “I can’t treat my 
impulse as reason-giving.  Not as a father.”  The father’s judgment that his violent impulse 
is rationally impotent reflects that he thinks it is inconsistent with his role as a parent to 
treat violent impulses as reason-giving.  A good father wouldn’t, and he wants to be a good 
father.  In this way, he is treating his ideal of parenting as normative for him.  He thinks 
this ideal should shape not only what he does, but how he goes about making practical 
decisions.  According to my proposal, such “norms of rational impotence” are elements of 
some personal ideals.  
The easy part of my proposal is to describe what a norm of rational impotence is, at least 
functionally.  For conceptual reasons, divide the process of practical deliberation into 
two stages: practical reasons are first collected, then subsequently weighed or otherwise 
compared, in an attempt to determine what ought to be done, all things considered.  A norm 
of rational impotence is relevant to the first stage; it is a rule for the collection of practical 
reasons, a rule that requires an agent to treat certain basic desires as rationally impotent. 
22  In my neo-Humean subjectivist theory, the standard or default connection between 
having a basic desire and having a practical reason to take the means to its satisfaction is 
defeasible, and a norm of rational impotence operates as a defeater.  It strips a basic desire 
of the capacity to generate practical reasons and thereby short-circuits the standard process 
22    Bratman also discusses treating a desire as reason-giving, and of decisions not to (1999, 2002).
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by which practical reasons are created.23  Otherwise put, my theory claims that there 
are “factors” relevant to practical deliberation that have a different shape than practical 
reasons.  Discussions of practical reasons are replete with useful metaphors.  A standard 
way of thinking about a practical reason is a gram weight on a scale: “I have a reason to X, 
but a weightier reason to Y.”  A norm of rational impotence functions differently.  It isn’t 
a consideration in favor of doing something; it renders, for an agent, certain basic desires 
incapable of generating a consideration in favor of doing something.24 
The central move in my argument is easy to miss.  Here it is.  Once we recognize there are 
agents who care about complex personal ideals that include, among other things, norms of 
rational impotence, there isn’t any compelling reason to exclude these norms, as a class, 
from the agent’s practical point of view.  They acquire normative authority—they “get into 
the agent’s will”—in the same way as the mother’s maxim to be more patient.  The voice 
of a cared-about personal ideal, such as an ideal of parenthood, speaks, making demands 
about how the parent ought (not) to treat his children, about how he ought (not) to feel about 
his children, and about what maxims to adopt.25  This voice has the practical authority to 
dictate how an agent is to think through his practical decisions in manifold ways.  Why not, 
then, about how he collects practical reasons?  
Initial Questions
It’s natural for a reader to have questions about my account of personal ideals.  I’ll attempt 
to anticipate and briefly address a few of these questions.  
How, for instance, does my proposal fit into the contemporary literature on practical 
reasoning?  The concept of a personal ideal is discussed, though sometimes under a different 
title.  Various philosophers posit practical reasons grounded in an agent’s “normative self-
conceptions” or “practical identities” (Copp 2005, 22; Nagel 1970; Parfit 1996; Korsgaard 
1996; Sen 1999; Hubin 2003).  For instance, Korsgaard, a contemporary Kantian, thinks 
that an agent’s “practical identities” are (commonly) a legitimate source of practical advice:  
A century ago a European could admonish another to civilized behavior by 
telling him to act like a Christian.  It is still true in many quarters that courage is 
urged on males by the injunction ‘be a man!’  Duties more obviously connected 
with social roles are of course enforced in this way.  ‘A psychiatrist doesn’t 
violate the confidence of her patients’.  No ‘ought’ is needed here because the 
normativity is built right into the role (1994).  
What’s unique about my proposal isn’t, in other words, my appeal to the concept of a 
personal ideal (whatever we choose to call it).  Nor is it that I appeal to “norms of rational 
impotence” (Raz 1975; Cohon 2000; Wolfe 2002).  What’s new is my emphasis upon the 
idea that personal ideals sometimes provide practical advice about how (not) to collect 
practical reasons; even more, it’s my claim that such ideals (and their associated norms) 
are sometimes the objects of an agent’s ruling passions and are thereby incorporated into 
23    Shemmer, a subjectivist, accepts ORIT but doesn’t appeal to a defeater account (2007). 
24    Raz discusses “exclusionary reasons”: “second-order reasons” that exclude from practical deliberation a “fact” (such as “I 
desire X”) that, absent the exclusionary reason, would generate a (pro tanto) practical reason (1975).  
25    Subjectivists should also adopt, I think, a qualification to the instrumental principle.  There are “illicit means”: an agent 
might have legitimate grounds not to take the effective means to one of his rationally potent desired ends because the means is 
rendered “ineligible” by one of his personal ideals: “a good mother cannot kill her beloved child, even if she has wants to succeed 
financially and has a large insurance policy on her child.”  Here the relevant basic desire is rationally potent, but the effective 
means is categorically ruled out by the strictures of her cared-about personal ideal.  
EuJAP | Vol. 9 | No. 2 | 2013
60
the agent’s will.  In summary, my proposal applies a contemporary idea, the concept of a 
personal ideal, to an old subjectivist puzzle in a novel way.  
Is my proposal in any sense ad hoc?  I don’t think so.  Though the mere conceptual possibility 
an agent might have a cherished personal ideal with a norm of rational impotence would 
suffice to render ORIT logically consistent with subjectivism, I want to suggest that my 
proposal has independent theoretical value: it gestures at a powerful way of analyzing 
certain “real-life” modes of practical reasoning.  To argue for this, I need to paint a plausible 
picture of how some people “bump into” norms of rational impotence in the run of life.  As 
I see it, we have a natural tendency to treat our basic desires as reason-giving.  This is part 
of what makes the striking cases so striking: these cases call into question this common 
tendency.  I treat my thirst as a reason to walk to the water fountain, my hankering for ice 
cream as a reason to go to the grocery store, my desire for my son’s welfare as a reason to 
feed and to clothe him.  Then I find in myself a violent impulse to harm him—and I recoil 
at it.  This is the momentarily mortifying experience that raises the salient question, present 
inchoately in everyday deliberation, about whether all (basic) desires are reason-giving. 
And at least in some cases, I propose, the agent with a shocking and disconcerting desire 
finds the desire shocking, disconcerting, and rationally impotent in virtue of a personal 
ideal she wants to live up to.  
How determinate are personal ideals?  There are cases, I think, in which the content of a 
personal ideal is clear, even codified.  As Korsgaard suggests, a person who wants to be 
a good psychiatrist will find some of the rules of proper conduct written in the relevant 
documents published by the American Psychiatric Association, or widely promulgated in 
discussions with other practitioners: ‘A psychiatrist doesn’t violate the confidence of his 
patients’.  But in other cases, an agent operates with a (more or less specific) mental picture 
of what an exemplar of the ideal is like, and confronts norms of rational impotence in 
reflection upon, or imagination of, what an exemplar would do.  For instance, a devoted 
Christian reared in a community that preaches God intends to redeem human beings in the 
fullness of time, to make them more Christ-like, might internalize a conception of Christ, a 
mental picture of Jesus, that implicitly includes norms of rational impotence.  Impulses that 
Christ would not have—because they are sinful—are to be treated as rationally impotent.26 
If Christ would not feel pure vengeance, because it isn’t neighbor-loving, his followers, 
striving to be more and more neighbor-loving, should treat whatever impulses of pure 
vengeance they happen to experience as rationally impotent.  In Christian thinking, the 
idea is that a person can recognize the sinfulness of a desire, take a stand against it (no 
delusion here), begin to work against it, and hope for its eventual eradication through God’s 
redeeming grace.  An early step in this process of becoming Christ-like is to strip the sinful 
desire of, if not existence, reason-giving status.  Likewise, many (though not all) moral 
ideals implicitly include norms of rational impotence.  It’s common for morally committed 
people to think morality cares not only about overt behavior, but also about internal 
characteristics: character, virtue, intentions, and motivation.  It wouldn’t be surprising to 
find a pacifist, for instance, who wants to model peace not only in his behavior, but also in 
his heart and who is therefore unwilling to treat a basic desire for pure vengeance as the 
source of a practical reason to strike back.
What function does having a cherished personal ideal play in rational agency?  Adopting 
a personal ideal might have important practical benefits.  A personal ideal that is clear 
and determinate serves to orient an agent in normative space, giving him substantive 
26    Penelhum provides a similar account (2000).
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practical advice about how to govern his own conduct and deliberation.  This practical 
benefit isn’t, though, guaranteed.  An extraordinarily complex, highly disputed, or unduly 
vague personal ideal could thrust an agent into difficult normative perplexities instead of 
helping him deliberate with greater conviction or ease. For several reasons, it can be very 
difficult to specify the content of a personal ideal.  It might be complex; as mentioned, 
a personal ideal could include practical advice about behavior, volition, feeling, and 
character.  The content of a personal ideal, such as an ideal of parenthood, could also be a 
matter of (protacted and serious) dispute, intrapersonal or interpersonal: one person thinks 
that a good parent spanks, another is repelled by the idea; in some moments, you think 
a parent ought to pay for a college education, in others that it is beyond the call.  Also, 
many personal ideals are, in terms of content, vague or indefinite—to varying degrees.27 
The complexity, disputability, and indeterminacy of personal ideals might go some way 
in explaining why it is that my proposal hasn’t previously been recognized or developed. 
To describe personal ideals requires sensitive practical anthropology, not merely analytic 
distinction-making, generally the purview of philosophers.  
A skeptic might wonder whether my proposal gives an agent’s cared-about personal ideals 
more normative authority than they warrant.28  It had better not.  We could easily imagine 
an agent who treats as normative a harmful (or otherwise rationally inadvisable) personal 
ideal.  Say a person without natural athleticism takes on the daily routine of a striving and 
ambitious jock and suffers under the weight of his (predictable) failures.  Wouldn’t it be 
better, we might wonder, if he didn’t treat this high athletic ideal and its demands—its 
guidelines and norms of rational impotence—as normative for him?  
How would my account address such a case?  To this particular question, I would respond 
in the standard way subjectivists do.  If the personal ideal places demands upon him that 
make it either impossible or exceedingly difficult for him to fulfill other ends that he cares 
about, or even cares about more, this would generate a strong practical reason for him 
to reject the relevant personal ideal, or to significantly weaken its demands on him.  On 
the other hand, if an agent cares about a personal ideal and, from the perspective of his 
other ruling passions, it is rationally advisable for the agent to continue to treat the ideal 
as normative—some of his ruling passions favor it, none speak significantly against it—
then it would be rational for the agent to submit to the personal ideal’s requirements.  If 
that personal ideal also includes norms of rational impotence, they will be, according to 
my account, valid for him, too.  One of the reasons that Watson and Frankfurt appeal to 
cases that involve loving parents, I suspect, is that it is natural for us to assume that loving 
parents regard their roles as parents as having an especially high priority, and they are 
willing to submit to its demands whatever other cares and loves they have.  
6. Taking Stock 
My proposal, if correct, solves one old puzzle in Frankfurt’s theorizing.  More generally, it 
indicates that subjectivism, contrary to how it is often represented, can countenance at least 
one form of “categorical” rational criticism, the disenfranchisement of basic desires.  This 
could be polemically useful for subjectivists: were any realists or Kantians to challenge 
subjectivism by appealing to ORIT, my proposal could help blunt the challenge.29  
27    In response to these issues, I think some practical reasoning consists in specifying the content of a personal ideal.  It’s often 
necessary, if a person is to live up to a personal ideal, to find ways to make more determinate the very general or vague practical 
advice it gives (Bratman 2002). 
28    This is a common objection to Korsgaard’s account, an objection, when directed at her, I agree with.
29    There are intimations of this objection in, among other places, Scanlon 1988 and Korsgaard 1994.
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All this said, a reader might wonder why my proposal—allegedly so “simple”—hasn’t 
already been broached.  I think there are several explanations.30  But with respect to this 
article’s central arguments, the most salient explanation is that Frankfurt has consistently 
conflated two types of desire “extrusion.”  I’ve indicated how Frankfurt, consistent with 
subjectivism, could analyze cases in which a basic desire is, in his view, properly “extruded” 
from the context of practical deliberation, cases in which the relevant desire fails, he thinks, 
to generate any practical reason for the agent.  But Frankfurt sometimes speaks of another 
form of desire “extrusion,” and this second type of desire extrusion raises new puzzles for 
Frankfurt’s four-decade project.  
Let me explain.  Several times, Frankfurt says “identification with a desire” is an action-
type “fundamental to any philosophy of action,” and that the act of identification is an 
“elementary maneuver of the will,” which brings an agent’s will, his practical point of 
view, into existence (1999, 103; 2006, 4).31  Perhaps Frankfurt is thinking of this type of 
example.  In the run of life, Sam finds in himself two new conations: a desire to take up 
biking, and a desire not to.  He is attracted in a basic way both to a life with, and to a life 
without, a biking habit.  Let’s suppose Sam’s ruling passions, the things he already cares 
about, don’t give him any reason to prefer one new desire to the other: his life would be 
equally enjoyable with or without the new hobby; he’s busy, but not so busy that he can’t 
carve out a bit of time for weekly biking.  More than that, his ruling passions don’t happen 
to give him a decisive reason to settle this internal competition: the decision ‘Take on the 
hobby or no?’ is on his mind these days, but it isn’t unsettling him; it’s not costing him any 
happiness, any significant time, or any significant mental energy.  To sum up the decision 
before him, to resolve his internal dispute, Sam will have to plunk for one desire or the 
other; but he could also, without being irrational, let the internal debate continue for the 
time being.  His practical point of view simply doesn’t speak in favor of one route or the 
other, or even in favor of settling the dispute.  
Say Sam happens to go in for biking.  He “identifies with” his desire to become a biker. 
Accordingly, he buys the necessary equipment; carves out time in his schedule; forms the 
intention to spend a few hours a week pedaling; and begins acting on that intention.  Focus 
on Sam’s act of identification: his choice for the one desire and against the other.  This 
choice was, we might say, a “brute opting.”  Sam simply “maneuvered his will.”  He made 
one desire the desired ends he intends to pursue—what Frankfurt calls a “goal”—whereas 
his anti-biking desire remains a “mere desire.”  By this choice, the anti-biking desire is, 
in one sense, “extruded”: it is excluded from his will, his practical point of view, which 
consists of—Frankfurt seems to be saying—his “goals,” cares, and loves.  
30    Frankfurt’s progress has been obstructed by an unhelpful analogy.  Frankfurt sometimes analyzes the loving father’s violent 
impulse as the conative analogue of obsessional thoughts.  Bizarre desires and obsessional thoughts often strike us as inexplicable, 
“out of the blue.”  This prompts Frankfurt to characterize “extruded desires” as “reckless impulses” and “hot surges of anarchic 
emotion” that should be considered “mental tics, twitches, and convulsions” (2006).  But, first, these descriptions don’t really fit 
all of the relevant cases.  As I construe her, the unwilling addict isn’t uncertain of her addictive impulse’s etiology; she has a very 
plausible (albeit sketchy and folk-psychological) explanation: she began taking drugs, and drugs are addictive.  Moreover, there 
isn’t any conceptual connection between treating a basic desire as rationally impotent and being unsure of its causal origins.  The 
devoted pacifist could know the evolutionary explanation for the etiology of his vengeful impulse and yet regard it as rationally 
impotent.  
31    Treating a basic desire as rationally impotent in virtue of a cared-about personal ideal is not a fundamental concept in my 
theory of rational agency; it’s a form of desire-based rational criticism.  A norm of rational impotence is a fundamental concept 
in the sense that you can’t analyze it by reducing it to beliefs and desires—a norm of rational impotence is a rule (for collecting 
reasons), not a belief or a desire.  But the justification for treating the norm as normative is that it is grounded in a basic desire.    
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Sam’s “extrusion” of his anti-biking desire, we should carefully note, is a different act of 
will than the unwilling drug addict’s disenfranchisement of her addictive desire.  At least in 
my stipulated analysis, the addict silences her impulse on the grounds that a ruling passion, 
a cherished personal ideal, calls for the clamorous impulse to be treated as rationally 
impotent.  Accordingly, she categorically rejects it.  By hypothesis, Sam doesn’t regard his 
anti-biking desire as condemned by a ruling passion.  He simply chooses not to make it one 
of his goals.  If Frankfurt were to call Sam’s brute opting an “extrusion” of his anti-biking 
desire, then we would have yet another type of “extruded desire”: a desire that loses out, in 
the competition to become a “goal,” to another desire.  
My proposal, though it renders Frankfurt’s endorsements of ORIT consistent with his 
subjectivist commitments, simply doesn’t speak to Frankfurt’s conception of extruding 
desires from the will by way of a brute opting.  This second type of desire extrusion raises, 
it turns out, new questions about Frankfurt’s subjectivist credentials.  Can a clear-headed 
subjectivist admit the existence of legitimate, will-creating brute optings?  Initially, it might 
seem not.  If Frankfurt regards Sam’s brute opting as normative, this seems tantamount to 
denying that legitimate chains of practical justification always, in every case, “bottom out” 
in an appeal, and only in an appeal, to a basic desire.  Sam’s chain of practical justification 
for his biking habit appeals not only to the existence of basic desires but to a brute act of 
will: “I simply aligned myself with one desire and not the other.”  Though Sam’s brute 
opting doesn’t itself generate practical reasons, this claim does give a non-desire-based 
act of will the normative authority to shape what an agent ought to do, rationally speaking. 
Then again, perhaps it’s a bit much to say that Frankfurt is, if he accepts this view, no 
longer a subjectivist.  The thesis that Sam’s brute opting helps to “create” Sam’s will does 
share subjectivism’s theoretical modesty.  This idea, though it has a constructivist lilt,32 
isn’t realist; it’s not an appeal to a robustly Kantian conception of practical reason; and it 
doesn’t seem to be subject to a Frankfurt-style, “one thought too many” objection.  Sam’s 
practical reasons—to buy a bike, carve out time, and so on—are grounded, partly, in his 
desire to have his hobby, and so desires are still doing significant normative work here.  
I haven’t solved this newly-identified puzzle in Frankfurt’s theorizing.  But—here’s 
the important point—we needn’t solve it to add the useful concept of personal ideals to 
subjectivist thinking.  
32    As does Frankfurt’s remarks at 2006, 8-11. 
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